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commitment or the number of troops involved can be brought out in the discussion. Since each commitment is sui generis there can be no Procrustéan framework for discussing the implications of cutting or reducing it. The following points, however, are tentatively suggested as being applicable to most of the commitments:-
(a)
would a reduction of the forces available to meet the commitment rather than their total removal be feasible, and would it make sense?
For example, the answer in the case of the Falkland Islands is probably "No" and in the case of Hong Kong possibly "Yes"
(b) what British interests would be affected by the reduction/ abrogation of the commitments? The net should be cast widely eg references where appropriate to the value the Americans may attach to our commitment, to trade prospects including arms sales and to sterling balances. But provided the points are made clearly they should not be developed in detail.7
(c)
consequential problems arising from reduction/abrogation. For example, reductions in the Far East may have consequences for the future of the Ghurkas, reductions in Malta for Maltese recruited into UK forces and reductions in the contribution to UNELYP for the viability of that force 7
(a)
timing considerations.
For example, there might be advantage in synchronising the removal of our contribution to the Five Power Defence Agreement with the run down of the Australian contribution. Or it might make a material difference to the prospects of a settlement with Guatemala if the announcement of the removal of our forces from Belize was delayed until 1975.7
Should
(e) if forces are removed what should be HMG's preferred position about the continuation of the commitment? we seek to withdraw from contractual commitments or should we let them run on because they do not bind us to any specific actions eg in the case of Mautirius?
(f) when and how should we consult our friends and allies about the reduction of our forces or the abrogation of our commitments?
For example, should we say anything on the subject at the meeting of the CENTO Military Committee in 9 and 10 April. How should we approach Archbishop Makarios in the light of his attitude towards the SBAS and British financial assistance to Cyprus?7
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