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NAVAL PRESENCE EAST OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
99. If it were decided no longer to maintain a regular naval presence East of the Cape of Good Hope, it would be necessary to consider how far this would affect our capacity to meet commitments in particular in dependent territories (see also section on Indian Ocean Dependencies), Before taking any decisions, it would be desirable to consult with the Americans, who have shown growing concern about the increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It might for example, be possible to say that HM ships would continue to visit the Indian Ocean from time to time.
GENERAL ASPECTS
100. The ability of HMG to maintain a naval presence in many of the world's oceans, to despatch forces trained in warfare in many different climates at short notice to wide areas of the globe
globe to respond rapidly to unforeseen situations, is in a variety of ways a major political asset. It increases our standing in the world, and in particular our influence with the United States. It give us an authority which other countries may lack in speaking about conflicts remote from our own shores. It also helps to promote our trade, and in particular our arms sales. Clearly, none of these assets can readily be quanti- fied, but they are nonetheless real. On the other hand there can be no ideal level of capability. Even the super-powers do not possess the perfect capability for dealing with every conceivable situation. At the other extreme, even a country like Austria is able to provide forces for the UN operation in Cyprus. In a situation in which it is essential to achieve large-scale savings, a fruitful approach might be to ask what capabilities 'HM forces no longer require instead of what specific commitments can be dropped. Thus one might ask whether it is still necessary for HM forces to be trained in jungle warfare,
The or whether we still need a large-scale air lift capability. elimination of any particular capability would have some undesirable political consequences (eg on our relations with Malaysia if our forces were no longer trained in jungle warfare) but these would probably be less than in the case of the elimination of almost any of our treaty and other political commitments, while the potential savings would probably be far higher.
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/101.