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72. No negotiated settlement with Argentina seems likely to be possible except on the basis of a transfer of sovereignty. In many ways such a transfer would be in British interest; it would remove a major irritant from Anglo-Argentinian relations, and a source of criticism at the United Nations, and there would be no US objection. However, it has always been rejected because it would be unacceptable to the Falklanders and consequently to a large section of public opinion in Britain.
73. If it were decided to withdraw the garrison, this would cause disquiet both in the Falklands and in the UK. It would also some- what increase the risk of an Argentinian takeover of the islands. Nevertheless, even if the garrison were withdrawn, we would have to maintain our present political stance. Anxiety caused by the withdrawal might to some extent be allayed if it were possible to arrange to train and equip a volunteer militia from among the Falklanders before the marines left.
74. If on the other hand it were decided to maintain the garrison, then a very early public announcement to this effect would be desirable in order to prevent unnecessary anxiety in the Falklands over the defence review.
75.
If the ice patrol ship were no longer deployed to the Antarctic, an alternative vessel would have to be provided from some source if British scientific and technical activities there were to continue. This is not primarily a political matter, although British partici- pation in this successful example of peaceful international co- operation is of some political value.
CONCLUSIONS:
76.
a)
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ANTARCTICA
If it were decided to withdraw the garrison from the Falklands, there should be no change in our political stance. If possible, we should train and equip a volunteer militia before the marines left.
b) If it were decided to maintain the garrison, an early public announcement to this effect should be made.
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/c.