SECRET
THE ATLANTIC AND THE CARIBBEAN
THE CARIBBEAN AND BERMUDA
59. The legal commitment to the defence of the remaining depen- dent territories and the Associated States is inescapable.
How-
ever there is no immediate external threat. If the naval force were withdrawn from the West Indies and an external threat were to develop we should have to counter it by deploying forces from elsewhere (probably Britain).
60. In the Caribbean dependent territories and Bermuda we have a contingent responsibility for internal security and law and crder, which, in the absence of naval units with Royal Marine detachments, might necessitate the deployment of forces from out- side the area.
61. In the five remaining Associated States we have no responsi- bility for internal affairs and no legal authority to intervene unilaterally. Nevertheless the presence of the naval units in the Caribbean has on several occasions in the past had a steadying in- fluence on the political situation; if the frigates are' withdrawn we must accept that this stabilising influence will be removed. 62. There remains a possibility that HMG might at some time in the future decide to accede to a request from the Government of an Associated State to make available HM Forces to aid the civil
power. If the frigates were withdrawn HM Forces would have to be provided entirely from outside the area.
63. The withdrawal of the frigates would almost certainly be un- welcome to the US Government. Before any final decision is taken that Government should be consulted.
64. In the Bahamas, as part of the package designed to secure a definitive agreement for continued use by HM Forces of various defence facilities, we have agreed to try to continue to patrol Bahamas' waters for some two years. It would therefore be neces- sary to inform the Bahamas Government of any proposed withdrawal of cur naval forces. This might make the conclusion of a defini- tive agreement marginally more difficult.
SECRET
/CONCLUSION:
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