SECRET
B
CENTO
CENTO AND THE MIDDLE EAST
43. If it were decided to withdraw altogether from CENTO, this would have an extremely damaging impact on our relations with the regional member countries of the organisation (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) and would be very badly received by the Americans who play a full part in CENTO activities. In the event of such a decision, some advance consultation with the Americans would be desirable, but otherwise the least damaging way of presenting the decision to withdraw completely would be to present it to our partners as a fait accompli (but informing them in any advance of public announcement).
44.
Assuming that we did not withdraw totally from CENTO, then if the British forces stationed in Cyprus and Malta and declared inter alia to CENTO were no longer required there for their primary national role, then it should be possible to negotiate the withdrawal of their declaration without much political damage. 45. The withdrawal of our declaration of forces might sour our good relations with Iran, a major oil producer (providing 18% of our oil imports), our second largest (£169m in 1973) and most rapidly developing export market in the Middle East as well as one of our largest customers for UK defence equipment. The Shah is acutely aware of the threat of increased Soviet activity and encirclement and is concerned that a possible easing of the situation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will release Soviet resources for deployment on her northern border. It would be important to give the Shah as much advance warning as possible of our intentions.
46. There might also be a risk to the overflying facilities which we enjoy on the route to the Far East. The seriousness to be attached to this risk would of course depend on the degree of importance which we continue to attach to the route. The risk could perhaps be minimised by advance consultation with Turkey and Iran.
17
SECRET
147.