SECRET
CONCLUSION:
FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT
21. The first requirement is thus to consult our four Commonwealth partners in order to ascertain their views on the maintenance of the consultative commitment, on the future of the Integrated Air Defence System and naval presence and on the form and timing of any withdrawals that may be decided upon during the review. The more obviously their interests are taken into account before any decisions are reached, the less will be the damage to British interests caused by any eventual withdrawals themselves.
BRUNEI
22. The future of the Gurkha battalion in Brunei is bound up with the question of our general relationship with the State. Under the Amending Agreement of 1971 we conduct Brunei's external relations and have a commitment to consult on the defence of Brunei similar
to the consultative commitment under the Five Power Defence
Arrangements.
The stationing of the battalion in Brunei involves us in no costs since these are fully met by the Sultan, who would strongly deprecate the withdrawal of the battalion. Withdrawal would bring into question whether we wished to maintain the consultative commitment on Brunei's defence, which could in turn be affected by the decision taken on the consultative commitment under the FPDA. What new arrangement might be sought with Brunei would depend on whether, even if the battalion were withdrawn, the jungle training facilities offered in Brunei were still required. It would also be necessary to consider how, in the event of a review of the arrangements with Brunei, the British economic interest in the Shell operation and in Brunei maintaining her reserves in sterling
could be assured.
23. Any proposal to remove the Gurkha battalion from Brunei, eg because of a decision to disband the Gurkha Brigade (see Hong Kong) could require us to review our general relationship with Brunei. (Such a review may also be necessary on other grounds.) Since the present relationship is enshrined in a formal agreement it could only be changed by formal discussions with the Brunei Government, of which Her Majesty's Government would have to give at least one year's notice. It is likely that the Sultan would tenaciously resist the review.
11
SECRET
/CONCLUSION: BRUNET