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Defence
Defence
13 MAY 1974
of NATO's deterrent strategy.
well-equipped ocean-going fleet cruisers, destroyers and escorts, some 350 operational submarines of which at least 100 are nuclear-powered, and a force of over 1,000 naval aircraft. An aircraft carrier will be added to the list in the near future. While NATO's total naval strength is at present greater in terms of numbers than that of the Warsaw Pact --though not all this strength is deployed in the immediate NATO area-the trend is a decline in NATO strength and an increase in that of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact's building rate for nuclear-powered submarines is now twice
that of NATO.
Furthermore, NATO naval strength includes a higher proportion of older, less effective ships and substantially fewer sea-borne missile systems. The House must also be aware that the development of large energy resources off our shores could add a new dimension to the mari- time threat and give rise to a new pro- tection task. [HON. MEMBERS:
"Hear, hear."] I do not mind the chorus of
"Hear, hear" from the Opposition Benches. I do not profess to be an alarmist. Indeed, I feel that I am always more of a realist. On defence, one must face the facts--[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—and those happen to be the facts of the threat. I do not think that open aggression against the West is a likely possibility at present. But the military power of the Warsaw Pact is a powerful potential instrument of war, and a deci- sive military superiority of that nature could be employed to reinforce political
pressures.
A falling-off in NATO's relative mili- tary strength and in its relative determina- tion to fight if need be could lead to a decline in its political self-confidence, in its cohesion, and in its power to resist such pressures. If this were to happen, the freedom of Western Governments to pursue policies of their own choice, either internally or in their foreign relations, could be restricted. We would be in a situation where our own policies and actions could be, at least partly, dictated by the reactions of other Powers.
The need is, therefore, for the West to have at its disposal strong and credible conventional deterrent forces, backed by a tactical nuclear capability, and this applies particularly to the quality of NATO's forces. This is the essence of
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Strategic
weapons represent the ultimate deterrent. But deterrence must be valid against the whole range of possible threats. This means that strategic weapons must be buttressed by tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces, to provide NATO with a range of options in response to the degree and nature of the attack, and with the ability in the face of a major deliberate attack to secure time for negotiations before having re- course to nuclear weapons.
Both sides of the House will readily acknowledge-the right hon. Gentleman recognised it-that NATO is and must be the linchpin of our security. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the Government's commitment to the alliance is indeed “unequivocal ", the term he has used in the past.
But, having spelt out the massive forces deployed along the Central Euro- pean East-West front, I feel that it must be disturbing to many people that so diverted and spent on defence and arms. much of many nations' resources are
I only hope that the many talks in pro- gress between East and West can reach conclusions which will provide a launch- ing pad for genuine détente and a lessening of offensive postures.
I am sure that the alliance, the Americans and the Russians, too, would welcome that change.
The alliance is defensive. It is cele- brating its 25th anniversary. Its aim has been to preserve stability and peace by deploying military forces, trained and ready to operate together, in sufficient strength to deter aggression. I emphasise
that our NATO contribution will remain the first charge on the resources that can be made available to defence.
When one is examining the impact of defence on national resources, the cal- culation is usually in terms of the pro- portion of GNP. The NATO figures for 1973 show us to be spending more in these terms than France or Germany. These figures are not, of course, the sole criterion in the assessment of relative burdens, but they certainly provide a point of departure and argument in our
reassessments.
Outside Europe we shall examine the contribution made in each case by our military presence to the maintenance of