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Cverus
(xi)
Such
Option Ai could lead to severe tensions between Greece,
Turkey and Cyprus. This might even lead to fighting because
of the destabilising effect of withdrawing our forces, and the
quarrels for possession of the SEAS which would ensue.
dangers would not be lessened if a decision were made to retain
only one of the SBA's; and for us the situation would be worse
in that our remaining troops might be involved, For this reason as well as for wider onesit would be a matter of great concern
to NATO. It would also lead to the abandonment (or to expensive reprovison) of an important part of our intelligence effort.
This could be on such a scale as to alter the American readiness
to share their intelligence product with us. Option A2 might
well cause the Cypriots to put severe pressure on us to abandon in their favour either or both of the Sovereign Base Areas and
in some circumstances this could lead to the sort of situation
which would arise under Option Al. The Americans would not like
any reductions in Cyprus but apart from the general NATO considerations mentioned above there are special American
considerations connected with the Middle East settlement which
would make them particularly unhappy with Option A1. Neither
Option would dispose of the Cyprus financial claims in respect
of the use by our forces of facilities in the Republic. It is
hoped that the existing UNFICYP Force will be replaced by a
team of observers, This would be very much smaller than the
existing Force and would be largely recruited from officers, who
could live off the land. We could argue that the necessity for
logistic support from the garrison of the SBAS would thus be
removed.
J12
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