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arrangements for their defence.
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It is important to note that various
commitments hang together or arc served by the same forces and
facilities. We therefore need a coherent policy for the non-NATO
area. It is also important to recall that the Americans attach
considerable importance to our non-NATO defence effort even if it
has come second to our contribution to NATO.
7. The following is a brief description item by item of the main
implications of Options A1 and A2. These are discussed at greater
length in background papers not attached to this report. It is
important to realise that whatever course is followed there will be
a number of important consequential decisions about consultation,
presentation and phasing. These decisions will require much more
detailed consideration than can be given here. However, the way
in which we deal with the other Governments concerned can be just
as important for our interests as the substantive decisions about
the future level of the forces in support of our commitments.
Hong Kong
(i)
2
Total withdrawal of the garrison from Hong Kong is not
inless
in practice an option until we abandon Hong Kong itself.
Kong could not be governed without a garrison:
Hong
confidence in
the Colony's future would not survive. Even a hint that such
an option was being considered in London would seriously
damage confidence. The elimination of the garrison would only
be conceivable in a situation where we intended to withdraw
politically in the immediate future.
Commonwealth Secretary has made it clear that withdrawal is
not in contemplation. Option A2 is likewise only a practical
proposition to the extent that it can be conducted in such a
The Foreign and
It will
way as to preserve confidence in the Colony's future. [It
be difficult but not impossible to manage ti
this. The Treasury
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