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RECUVED IN
REGISTRY Ns.31
20 JUN 1974
WILK 10/9
Introduction
1.
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GEOGRAPHICAL COMMITMENTS
Annex J
ind
29
Before Divine
fire
The United Kingdom commitment to the NATO Alliance is the
linchpin of our defence policy. Every possible saving in expenditure
on non-NATO obligations and their back-up must therefore be rigorously
sought. Two alternative options are set out below. The first involves
abandoning all our non-NATO commitments within a year or two on the
grounds that on the scale of military priorities there is no justifi-
cation for British involvement outside the Alliance given the financial
constraints of the Defence Review. The second option provides for
progressive partial withdrawal from nearly all non-NATO commitments,
(some of which however, have direct relevance and value to NATO) on
the basis that total withdrawal would involve unacceptably high
political costs for the relatively modest savings achieved and that
the continuance of some non-NATO effort is justified in terms of
British standing in the world, British exports and in some cases
political stability. The political implications of the two options
are also discussed.
Savings
2. The saving from complete withdrawal would be some £110m (Option
A1) a year on average. Until a detailed study has been carried out
to determine the minimum military forces which would be viable in each
location, mainly Cyprus, Hong Kong and Gibraltar, from which complete
withdrawal is considered impracticable under Option A2, a precise
estimate of the savings from partial withdrawal cannot be made; but
the effect is likely to be to reduce the 2110m by between one third
and a half.
Both the £110m under Option A1 and the reduced saving
under Option A2 are gross, in that they do not allow for compensating
payments either to individuals or governments,
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