SEEGRET
and the loss of the UK contribution to the defence of NATO's flanks,
would have serious political consequences in Norway and Denmark.
In both these countries the problem is as much one of confidence as
of military capability. Public support for membership of the Alliance
NATO's
and for the maintenance of a defence policy based on a collective
ability to resist Soviet attack would be seriously undermined if the
UK were to abandon its supporting role on the Northern Flank.
present contingency plans for defending the Northern Flank are
critically dependent on the UK contribution, and would be called into
question without it. So long as Norway and Denmark maintain their
policy of not permitting the permanent stationing of foreign forces
on their territory, the British rapid reinforcement capability is of
great importance in ensuring continued Danish and Norwegian member-
ship of the Alliance. Of the countries with a sufficient capacity to
and provide reinforcements, the Americans have much further to come,
the Germans, even if they were politically acceptable, are fully
engaged on the central front. The British contribution cannot the refore
be replaced by another member of the Alliance.
85. This sort of problem would be much less for the Southern Flank.
British forces do not play a key role in the Alliance's reinforcement
plans for the Southern Flank area and the Greeks and Turks look
primarily to the Americans, particularly the Sixth Fleet, for support.
The military imbalance on the Southern Flank is moreover less than on
the North and the political links between Greece and Turkey on the one
hand and the UK on the other are much more distant. In any case, Greek,
Turkish, and indeed Italian, reactions would be governed mainly by our
decisions with regard to Cyprus and Malta, by comparison with which the
maintenance or loss of the British reinforcement capability is from
their point of view much less significant.
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SEGBEIT