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reinforcement of our Southern Flank would be limited to the possible
deployment to that sector of ACE Mobile Force contingent.
Option B.2. (Total abandonment)
81. The option of abandoning all specialist reinforcement capabilities,
including the whole of the amphibious force, all Army specialist reinforcement forces and the whole of the air transport force, and
relying for any reinforcement capability on civil sea and air transport has been examined (see paragraphs 69-70 of Annex C). But
it has been rejected on the grounds that the additional reductions in
special capabilities would represent too great a diminution of SACEUR's readily available strategic reserve, and a dangerous weakening of the Alliance's guarantee of the security of the Northern Region.
It would also deprive us of the ability not only to reinforce the
Northern and Central Regions, but also to carry out a large number of
other tasks requiring in particular air transport.
Savings
82. The reductions in our specialist reinforcement capabilities
outlined in paragraphs 78-80 above (Option B.1.) would save about
£40M in 1978/79 and £125M in 1983/84, including about £27M in
1978/79 and £60M in 1983/84 on account of the savings on the Air
Transport force. These savings are included within the total savings
on Option C below.
83. The savings from total abandonment of all our specialist reinforcement capabilities (paragraph 81 above (Option B.2.)) might be of the order of £100M in 1978/79, rising to £190M in 1983/844.
Political Consequences
841 The substantial abandonment of specialist reinforcement forces
and particularly our contribution to NATO's multinational ACE Mobile
Force which is of special psychological importance to the Alliance
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