STORET
If US
NATO is regarded by the Americans, by our European allies and no
doubt by the Warsaw Pact, as the index of our resolution. disengagement from Europe (which will be encouraged by UK cuts) is
to be avoided, it is essential to show the Americans that the
Europeans are prepared to cooperate among themselves and do more in
their own defence. Our European allies too regard the maintenance
of a substantial British capability in Europe, the Atlantic, and
particularly on the central front as indispensable to Alliance
solidarity and the credibility of NATO strategy. We need to oonvince
our allies in the course of consultation that we remain ready to
cooperate fully with them and to pull our weight in the common cause.
moreover we need to preserve our position, and must not undermine the
general position of the Alliance, on the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, (eee paragraphs 6973 below).
Specialisation and Rationalisation
on
65. The positive side of consultation is that we might be able to
take a lead in a determined effort to persuade our allies to treat
NATO as an entity both as regards forces in being and also in the support for them. It is true that specialisation (one ally undertaking a military role on behalf of others) and rationalisation (one ally
undertaking a military function, eg logistic support or R & D, behalf of others) within the Alliance, whether at the level of
individual equipment projects or at the high level at which a country
unbalances its own forces in the interests of securing a better
balance of Alliance effort, have so far had only meagre results.
Twenty-five years after the creation of NATO almost every member
country still tries to provide a wide spectrum of defence capabilities.
In this respect the division of labour has scarcely begun.
another way it has gone too far. There is remarkably little
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