SECRET SECRET
ced to make savings of such an order that might call into question
our contributions to NATO and hence the viability of NATO strategy,
they must urge Ministers to begin by withdrawing from all non-NATO
commitments. They recognise that there will be severe political
obstacles to a decision to begin total withdrawal; and, to the extent
that these could not be overcome, either additional funds would need
to be found or further reductions made in our provision for our
hard-core NATO commitments. The reduction of our NATO Forces
significantly below their present levels would make it more difficult
to reinforce than at present.
Political Considerations
58.
Complete abandonment of our commitments and activities outside
the NATO area would have far-reaching implications for our defence
and foreign policy in general and serious repercussions in other
critical fields. It would reduce our standing in the world generally
and most particularly with the Americans who value the support we
give to Western interests outside NATO. Hence it would reduce our
bargaining power not only in various parts of the world but also in
allied councils. It would effectively end Commonwealth links in the
defence field. It would mean abandonment for the first time of HMG's
responsibility for the defence of our dependent territories, even
though some of them are under the potential threat of external
aggression; this would affect our political credibility and belief
in our readiness to honour our contractual and constitutional
obligations. The same considerations apply though to a lesser degree
with the partial withdrawal suggested in Option A2.
59.
We cannot escape some political and commercial damage if we
make any significant reductions in our non-NATO obligations. However,
the selective retention of some commitments and activities, some of
27
SECRET
SECRET