SFCRRCRET
ii)
Option A2 - Partial Withdrawal
This alternative involves a phased rundown of those commitments
which do not flow directly from the North Atlantic Treaty.
While we would be giving up a number of c ommitments, we should
retain some, especially Hong Kong, Cyprus and Gibraltar.
Under both options we would also retain same capability for more
widespread deployment on an intermittent basis as a spin-off from
provisions made primarily to meet NATO commitments.
56.
The annual average savings under Option A1 would be:
Cyprus
Hong Kong
Five Power Defence Arrangements
Gibraltar
Malta
Gan/Indian Ocean
Belize/Caribbean
S. Atlantic
Gulf Brunei
Seato
£M
38
22
8
14
14
5
2.5
0.5
3
with partial withdrawal (Option A2) savings would be reduced by about
one third or one half from the savings of £110m under Option A1.
Residual expenditure would mainly be in Cyprus, Hong Kong and Gibraltar
(see Annex A). All the above savings take full account of the con-
sequential savings in the form of support costs, special equipment,
specialist research and development and so on which would no longer
be required as a result of withdrawal. They do not, however, provide
for compensation payments, either to individuals or to governments by
way of technical assistance payments which could be substantial.
Military Considerations
57. From the military point of view and in terms of the priorities
endorsed by Ministers at their OPD(74) 3rd Meeting, our expenditure
on non-NATO commitments must take second place to our first priority
of our contribution to the NATO Alliance and to the security of the
United Kingdom. If, therefore, the Ministry of Defence are to be
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