in these products has for some years been considerably
higher than the respective butoirs. We assume that there
is no objection to a beneficiary reaching the butoir;
this is what they are for; and as indicated in the Memoran-
dum, Hong Kong's reaching the butoir has not denied access
to other beneficiaries under the Scheme. Indeed in view
of Hong Kong's contribution to tariff quotas, it can be
said that Hong Kong and the fact that GSP imports from Hong
Kong are limited by the butoir at levels lower than the
level of Hong Kong's contribution to the tariff quotas has
provided increased opportunities for other beneficiaries.
The fact that a beneficiary is utilising the preference
scheme cannot be used to support a case for discrimination
against it, and I would emphasise that what we are talking
about is not whether Hong Kong should be given additional
benefits,
in fact the exclusion of textiles and footwear
has meant discrimination against two-thirds of Hong Kong's
exports to the EEC -, but whether, because it has a proven
ability to compete in some areas, it should have its trading
interests put in danger as a result of being discriminated
against. Yet this is what the new GSP proposals, if
implemented, will do to Hong Kong. We will be classified
as super-competitive in 15 items and stand to lose up to
31.5 million u.a.'s preferential trade as a result of the
imposition of a 15% butoir as compared with 50% for other
beneficiaries.
G
8. The principle of creating super-competitive suppliers,
although appears to be non-discriminatory, does in fact
work to Hong Kong's disadvantage.
The explanation for this
is that while Hong Kong's competitors can and do manufacture
the same range of items as Hong Kong, due to the economic
and physical limitations of Hong Kong, we do not make the