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THAT THESE ARE NOT LIKELY TO DE DISCRIMINATORY:
E) HE NOW WEEDS CUR QUOTE HELP UNQUOTE IN THE STRUGGLE EVEN TO PRESERVE THE BASIC FROZEN LEVELS BUTOIR (UNDERLINED)
CONCEPT WITHIN THE GENERAL SUPER-COMPETITIVE PROPOSALS.
3. TRAN FINALLY ADMITTED WITH RELUCTANCE THAT THE REAL
SUPER-COMPETITIVE PROBLEM WAS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND
ITALY, BUT THE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED, FOR EXAMPLE,
BY THE DUTCH BEING OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO ANY BENEFIT
AT ALL BEING GIVEN A SUPER-COMPETITIVE SUPPLIER.
4. HE ASSERTED IN DUE COURSE THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WERE
NOW PREPARED TO HELP AND VOLUNTARILY TO LIMIT THEIR TARIFF-QUOTA PERFORMANCE TO ITALY (AND OTHERS)
INDIVIDUALLY TO 50% OF THE PROPOSED NEW SPECIAL EEC BUTOIRS (UNDERLINED) FOR 1975.
5. IF HONG KONG WAS NOT SIMILARILY PREPARED TO ENGAGE
IN A FORM OF QUOTE SELF-LIMITATION UNQUOTE, TRAN WARNED
THAT THE SPECIAL BUTOIRS THEMSELVES MIGHT WELL HAVE TO BE REDUCED TO, SAY, 19% (MEANING CUTBACK), OR BE DIVIDED ONCE ACAIN INTO COUNTRY QUOTAS, OR EVEN WORSE. HE CONCEDED THAT
THIS MEANT MORE OVERT DISCRIMINATION BUT IN THE PRESENT
POLITICAL ARENA, IN HIS OPINION, IT WAS ALMOST NAIVE FOR
HONG KONG STILL TO BE RELYING ON CLAIMS OF EQUITY, HARDSHIP,
TRADE DIVERSION, OR EVEN POTENTIAL SERIOUS FOLITICAL UNREST
IN THE COLONY, HONG KONG AS SUCH WAS A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.
RICHTLY OR WRONGLY, HE WENT ON, IN TERMS OF THE EEC:CSP
A FEW EUROPEAN POLITICIANS IN BONN OR PARIS SEEMED TO
COUNT FOR MORE THAN THE POTENTIAL FATE OF FOUR MILLION
CHINESE.
6. TRAN REFUSED TO BE PINNED DOWN ON THE EXACT FORM OF SELF-
LIMITATION HE HAD IN MIND. HE INSISTED THAT HE WAS NOT
QUOTE NEGOTIATING UNQUOTE.
THE SUGCESTION HOWEVER BASICALLY
AMOUNTS TO OUR VOLUNTARILY MANAGING OUR CERTIFICATION
ARKANGEMENTS FOR THE GSP IN 1975 TO ENSURE THAT NOT MORE THAN 50% OF ANY SPECIAL EEC PUTOIR (UNDERLINED) GOES IN PARTICULAR TO ITALY, THE BENELUX, FRANCE, OR IRELAND.
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/ TRAN'S