There
(a) the rest of the Community are unlikely to be moved by threats;
Hong Kong would be antagonising them to no purpose.
would be considerable erosion of such sympathy as there is
for Hong Kong's position; this might lead to the abandonement
of any idea of GSP improvements for Hong Kong's textiles, or
even footwear; indeed, it could increase support for the Dutch
Р
view that super-cometitive suppliers should not receive GSP
benefits at all
(b) by insisting on negotiating under Article 3, Hong Kong would
run the risk of-lopsing-administration of the controls (see
para.4). There are financial and other advantages to Hong Kong
in retaining management of the quotas in her own hands. (para 7)
Hong Kong should bear in mind that there are already disturbing
suggestions by a number of Com munity countries that the new
textile agreements should be on the basis of import control instead
of export restraint,
(c) while we fully understand how objectionable GSP discrimination
is to Hong Kong, we believe that in practical terms elimination
of this discrimination is of less importance to her than the
securing of the maximum access possible under the new nstraint
arrangements. Even as a full beneficiary under the EEC's textile
GSP, Hong Kong would only obtain duty-free entry for a small
proportion of her exports to the Community (and as she has often
pointed out, the financial benefit of the concession goes
to the importer, not the exporter). We suggest that Hong Kong
should resume such negotiating muscle as she has for the textile
agreement negotiations rather than expend it (almost certainly
fruitlessly, and probably counterproductively) in a GSP context.
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