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but it is not mock humility which leads me to classify myself as a layman on many of these issues.) The Governor has no-one to turn to. We have; and I am increasingly of the view that we should exploit our advantage; and bring both the Treasury and the Bank of England fully into the picture.
2.
I recognise that there are important sensitivities involved here, and that we don't want knowledge of particular personal relationships spread further than is absolutely necessary. But there is, or so it seems to me, an incongruity in a situation in which the Governor of Hong Kong can talk freely to some of us; can talk (how freely I do not know) to the Governor of the Bank of England; and yet I talk to Mr Peyton not knowing how much he knows (if anything) and he has to talk to me not knowing what I know (if anything). Neither of us know what the Treasury know (if anything). We stand in some danger
of transmuting problems in Hong Kong into problems in Whitehall; and in that process denying ourselves advice which should be available to us.
3. I recognise, too, that the proposed letter is strictly personal, and that its purpose is to keep the Governor in touch with FCO thinking and to get his reactions to that thinking. But it is not just because I remember a disobliging remark which he let slip in a personal telegram about the quality of expertise available in the FCO that I have the feeling that the Governor might feel himself on surer ground if we were able to say or imply that the ideas we were throwing at him had some support (or at least acquiescence) elsewhere
in Whitehall.
4. What I find myself wondering, therefore, is whether there might not be a case for taking the Bank of England and Treasury fully (or as fully as is compatible with our relationship with the Governor) into our confidence. This need not involve a wide circle: I suggest that Mr Peyton and Mr Barratt would suffice.
5. You may recall that the last time that Hong Kong's monetary problems were discussed inter-departmentally was at a meeting between Mr Barratt, Mr Peyton, and myself in December 1973. (I attach a copy for ease of reference). Conveniently, it was left that we should initiate action at an appropriate time. This provides us with a tailor-made basis for initiating discussion of the sort of ideas we would suggest floating to the Governor.
6.
Of course adraft for their eyes would need to be somewhat sanitised: though we can assume with some confidence that both
3.
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/are