Mr March
Mr Bentley
Mr Male
Mr Wilford
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I attended the talk at Chatham House on Tuesday afternoon given by Sir John Addis on "China: the next 25 years". (The talk was off the record).
1.
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2. Sir John prefaced his remarks by saying that it would be mis- leading to think that China will follow the same course of develop- ment as other countries. Because there were now 1,800,000 bicycles in Peking it did not mean that these would in due course be replaced by 1,800,000 cars. The system was different but nevertheless it worked. Indeed it was astonishing just how efficiently it operated. After 25 years the régime was firmly entrenched and had survived many shocks (Korea, the withdrawal of the Soviet Advisers, the Great Leap Forward, the poor harvests of the early 1960s and finally the Great Froletarian Cultural Revolution).
Agriculture
3. Turning to agriculture, Sir John said that he thought that some form of collective ownership was likely to endure. This was inevi- table and in the general interest in view of the large rural popula- tion and the relatively small area of land which is capable of cul- tivation. The majority of peasants are against any departure from the collective principle. The advances made particularly in irriga- tion, tree planting and the terracing of hillsides were tremendous and agricultural production was near to the stage where any natural disaster could be withstood. The population was likely to be 1 bil- lion by the year 2000 but Sir John expected that agricultural output would keep pace with this growth.
4.
In the view of the Chinese leaders, Sir John said, it was essen- tial that the size of the cities should not increase. In the coming years he expected that the inequalities between the cities and the rural areas would be reduced with gradual improvement in the standard of living in the countryside. The "down to the country" movement was a key point of present Chinese policies. The process was a very dif- ficult one and could be taken as a touchstone of the overall success or failure of the régime. If, in the coming years, the movement was seen to be a success then this would be a sign that the régime itself was working normally. Sir John expected present policies to continue successfully.
5. Speculating further on Chinese agricultural policies Sir John re- ferred to the Tachai Commune where production teams and private plots had been abolished, as a possible model for the future. It would not
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be surprising if at some future date a campaign was mounted for their abolition throughout the country.
Foreign Trade
6. After speaking briefly about industry and referring to the present emphasis on worker participation in management, Sir John turned to for- eign trade. He said that China was not building up large reserves of foreign currency with a view to industrialization. The Chinese approach was to look and see what items they required and having decided that to find out how they could pay for them. The present dependence on foreign trade was tactical. China's long term policy was one of complete self- reliance.
Foreign Policy
7.
China's foreign policy, Sir John said, was based on the view that the USSR was in an expansionary phase whilst the USA was becoming pro- gressively weaker. Chinese leaders do not however believe that there is any immediate Soviet threat although they use this theme continually in their propaganda. They did however fear Soviet encirclement in the
It was same way that they had previously feared American encirclement. for this reason that they had sought an accommodation with the USA.
8.
Sir John added that the Chinese believe that the super powers are not only contending but also colluding. There could therefore be no real détente. They saw the EEC as a useful counterbalance, supported UK membership and preferred Mr Heath to Mr Wilson. Sir John said that in the Chinese view China would never be a super power. (He quoted Teng Hsiao-ping's definition of a super power in his speech at the United Nations earlier this year). China would however increase its great power role and would alter the rules of the game of great power Soviet behaviour. Sir John suggested that the US had realized this. naval policy on the other hand had a distinctly anachronistic ring to it. (Questioned after his talk about what he meant by changing the rules of the game, Sir John said this was a new thought and one which he had not yet developed. He did not elaborate).
9. Referring to Sino-Japanese relations, Sir John said that the Chinese consider these to be at a crossroads. One fork led to a return to mili- tarism, whilst the other fork led to Japan as a good member of the Asiatic community. Sir John said that he had suggested to Chinese of- ficials that there was some other composite fork involving close com- mercial followed by close political relations with the USSR. The Chinese however whilst admitting that this was theoretically possible had said that they did not think it a practical possibility. In more relaxed mo- ments the same officials had admitted that they thought that Japan would take the fork of being a good neighbour.
10. Asked to say something about Hong Kong, Sir John quoted the stan- dard Chinese position that Hong Kong was not a question to be solved at the present time. We did not ask them and they did not say, he added, how long "the present time" is. Sir John then said that he had had a
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new thought on Hong Kong. He explained that the Chinese Government's policies on its international frontiers had consistently been for the last 25 years that in any discussion of frontiers the other party must admit that the frontier had been imposed by unequal treaties. Once that principle had been conceded then the Chinese were ready to discuss the frontier on the basis of the status quo. Burma and Fakis- tan had made statements which the Chinese regarded as satisfactory and a solution had been found to their frontier problems. The Soviet Union and India on the other hand had refused to make any statement and no settlement had been reached. Sir John thought that it was pos- sible that the Chinese might insist on a similar British concession on the question of unequal treaties in any future negotiations with HMG on the future of Hong Kong. He added that no Chinese official had actually suggested this to him.
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11. Sir John then said that he did not think that events in Macao were likely to affect Hong Kong. Feking's position in Macan was quite different to that in Hong Kong. A more instructive analogy was Taiwan. Sir John saw the gradual absorption of Taiwan into China as a virtual certainty. He thought that in the initial stages the island would have a special status, but that eventually Taiwan would become a full province of China.
12.
In answer to a question from Lord Trevelyan about what would harpen in the final years of the lease on the new territories, Sir John admitted that he did not know. He said that all that was cer- tain was that that moment had not yet arrived, and that we still had a few more years, perhaps 5 or 10.
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13. Other subjects raised during questions were:
The Succession
Sir John said that no-one could succeed Mao. The Chinese leaders were thinking in terms of collective leadership, at least in the first period. He did not think that Chou would resume the full ex- ercise of his powers. Nor did he think that there had been any at- tempt to whittle down his powers in the recent campaign, although he may himself have connived at certain veiled criticisms which were made of him. Already day to day control of affairs were in the hands of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Li Hsien-nien. They were people of outstan- ding personality, powers of concentration and experience. The emer- gence of any new personality was likely to be a slow process taking place over perhaps the next 2 years. He did not think that Wang Hung-wen would emerge as a dominant figure.
China and SE Asia
14. Sir John said that he did not think the Chinese had any particu- lar wish to establish their hegemony in the region. Hanoi was fierce- ly independent maintaining a balance between Moscow and Feking. China did not have a forward policy in Cambodia or Laos. As regards ASEAN the leaders in Peking were sitting tight and waiting for ASEAN leaders
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