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The
next a Government Minister went to Peking. Chinese could be expected to increase their pressure
if and when they saw grounds for dissatisfaction concerning other events or trends in Hong Kong.
14.4
Lord Goronwy-Roberts said that in his opinion
HMG should continue to stand firm. At the same time,
a negative response could be expressed in such a way as to explain to the Chinese (who were more interested
than the East Europeans in the reasons behind a decision of this sort) why it was being given.
15.
15.1
Chinese Immigration, Legal and Illegal
Sir M MacLehose said he understood HMG had
provisionally agreed that Hong Kong could resume
discussions with the Chinese about the return of
illegal immigrants (excluding refugees) who were caught
before they reached the urban areas. The rate of
illegal immigration was running at double the
corresponding rate for 1973. Some sort of deterrence (despite the inherent dangers of driving the traffic underground) was now essential. He wanted to look
again at the latest figures, for illegals and legals, and to assess public opinion in Hong Kong. He would
inform the FCO, after his return, of what he proposed
to do. There would be an advantage in acting fairly
quickly, while the recent South Vietnamese case was
fresh in people's minds.Sir Murray emphasised that
Hong Kong could not contemplate returning illegals who
were only identified after they had become absorbed in
the urban areas. He added that, except for one
relatively junior NCNA official, the Chinese had never
asked for return of illegals in general: their requests had always related to specified groups.
15.3 Sir M MacLehose undertook that any illegals would be screened in order to safeguard against
returning a genuine refugee. However, screening would inevitably have to be somewhat 'ad hoc'
and it was
essential both that return should be effected within
24 hours of identification and that the screening
process should not be publicised.
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/15.4.
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