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anything which British Ministers could do, short of agreeing to a revival of the death penalty, to tighten up penal sanctions in Hong Kong, in a way that would help the fight against crime and maintain public confidence by blunting the edge of the popular demand for the death penalty.
15.
Sir Murray MacLehose acknowledged the force of Lord Goronwy-Roberts's political judgment on this issue. There was no doubt that public opinion in Hong Kong overwhelmingly supported the
death sentence in extreme cases, and he was bound to advise that the Creech Jones formula was the right policy for Hong Kong. Nevertheless, he had already warned ExCo that in present circum- stances no UK Secretary of State would be likely to permit an execution in Hong Kong. He would, however, need to ask Mr Callaghan on 24 June for an explicit statement on whether the Creech Jones
formula could be revived. ExCo had agreed that it would be better to avoid a confrontation with the UK, and themselves to advise reprieves. But this understanding rested on ExCo's trust in his own unsupported judgment of the situation in the UK. It might not anyway survive. He needed to be able to reinforce his own opinion with a clear statement from UK Ministers.
16.
Sir Murray agreed that it would also be worth examining possible other extensions of penal sanctions. A major problem in Hong Kong was violent crime inspired by the Triad societies, which were virtually a Hong Kong Mafia. If hardened criminals were not to be deterred by the death penalty it might be possible to approach the problem of the Triad societies in other ways, such as an extension of Preventive Detention for hardened criminals. This would
also do something to maintain public confidence.
The Defence Review
17.
Sir Murray MacLehose had already discussed this subject with Mr Rodgers and with FCO and MOD officials. He would be discussing it further on 24 June both with the PUS and with the
Secretary of State.
18.
He understood the UK situation, and the need for sweeping economies. However, consideration of the needs of Hong Kong should start from a recognition that 63 rds units had been fully deployed in the troubles of 1967. Hong Kong's external relations with China had since improved, but reductions in the size of the garrison would
/need to be
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