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least in the sub-committee on foreign economic interests where we would also have to participate. Our friends should not be allowed to shelter behind us. The French and Germans must defend their own interests; so must the Portuguese. Nor should we be put into a position where we would be in a minority in supporting the US on Puerto Rico or indeed where the Americans would look to us to try to defend the Portuguese in order to preserve American facilities in the Azores.
4. Secondly, Salim himself has told me (in reply to my direct question) that he would advise against our full re-entry. So has Ambassador Seignoret of Trinidad and Jim McIntyre, the Permanent Representative of Australia. I have naturally wondered if Salim's advice was genuine. I have concluded however that he wants his Committee to function effectively and his own reputation to be enhanced as a result. He probably calculates that if we co-operate with the Committee on a basis short of actual membership then some useful advances towards the decolonization of our smaller territories could result. seems to accept that we shall inevitably differ on Southern Africa; that on those subjects there would be some fairly bitter exchanges; and that we would not be able to support Committee resolutions on these subjects. (This of course holds good for Rhodesia too, but see para 8 below). Moreover, the Committee has tended to become more of an exclusive Afro- Asian affair over the years, and he may want to keep it that way.
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He
I have had the pros and cons both of rejoining and of partial co-operation set out in the annex to this letter to show our analysis of the options open. There remains the basic question whether we should co-operate at all, and on that I have no hesitation in recommending that we should. We are not without friends on the Committee especially where our smaller territories are concerned. We can influence the running debate on self-determination versus independence. You will see from the record of the general exchange of views on 4 April on the problems of the smaller territories, which we have reported separately, that with the exception of the Bulgarian and to a lesser extent the Iraqi, there was general agreement that these territories needed quite different solutions from those applicable to southern Africa. Also there was agreement that the wishes of the inhabitants were paramount, and that if this meant a solution falling short of full independence then the Committee should generally acquiesce. It is clearly in our interests to promote this line of thinking as much as we can. I also feel that there is a wide expectation that the new UK Government will wish to co-operate with the Committee, and I can see no reason why we should not do so.
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