On the other hand,
swer that we
could not go all the ums with the committed
mistions, our influence would be dimmstedto the extent that we were consider
obstructive. Moreover
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mission for Pitcairn without any clear justification). On the other hand we must expect the Committee
in considering our smaller dependent territories
to maintain its general ideological commitment
tutoit ho
h
particularly as visiting to independence, to continue to condemn foreign
economic interests and expectation of natural including BIOT resources, to criticise military bases to back any call for independence or constitutional change
even from a small minority in a territory, and to
support the claims of Spain to Gibraltar and of
Mr Richard the Argentine to the Falkland Islands.
U emphasises that "whatever we do will not suddenly
become sweetness and light". This is certainly
Castroat, problem is that, it th commitler at any stage showed scruned interest in Hay Kay, we could be part in a difficult position. But this is unlikely, quien the Chinese
A further argument in favour of co-operation
which Mr Richard does not mention is that if
Ministers decide, as the result of a separate
study, in favour of an accelerated programme of
decolonisation, we may find the Committee of 24
of some help in stimulating a wish for independence
on the part of peoples at present apathetic or
opposed to it. However, this is likely to be
true.
8.
A potential text
of marginal value only.
9. In summary, therefore, greater co-operation
is likely to be useful as an element in the
athitunde.
Government's wide policy of enhancing their support
The other consideration
of the UN as a whole.
There are other marginal
are more finely balanced.
benefite and only miner disadvantages.
Should we become a full member? (Paragraphs 2-4 and Annex of Letter)
10.
Mr Richard argues persuasively against full
/membership.
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