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It might
need constitutional relationships with larger countries.
be easier to do so if we could restrict ourselves to the three
solutions described in Resolution 1541, but our chances of success
at the U.N. are in any case so poor that we need not refuse to
consider other devices, such as those described in paragraphs 13
and 25 above.
Conclusion
39. The future of the dependent territories is not the only
department of British affairs overseas where it is easier to see
what should not be done that what should. With the exceptions
mentioned above we should not encourage them to seck separate
independence; we should not, at least for some time, offer
integration; we should not look to the U.N. to provide solutions.
Nor should we enbark on any accelerated progranne of decolonization,
regardless of our general international policies and the needs of
the territories themselves.
The
is
40. On the positive side what we require as in other matters
an armoury of alterative solutions and a flexible, approach.
best way to keep our options open is the traditional one of develop-
ing democratic institutions and encouraging each territory to run its
own affairs to the maxinun practical extent. Such a policy leads
naturally to "association" relationships rather than to integration,
which may nevertheless turn out to be the right solution for a few of
the smallest territories. For a few territories too there are distant
possibilities of union or association with another Commonwealth country
or with a United States territory. We should be careful not to close
the door on these possibilities. But there is no real option of transferring our responsibilities to the U.N., which we should regard
as a forum for the explanation and discussion of our policies rather
than as a separate authority with powers and policies of its own.
Constitutions Department,
D.T.D.
August, 1967
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