C
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference..
just be possible to imagine a situation in which HMG while unable to duck responsibilities either vis a vis Hong Kong or vis à vis Peking might find itself less embarrassingly caught in the middle if the Hong Kong Chinese were more involved with the Government;
(h) nonetheless, and in conclusion, it is hard to see that these points will add up to a powerful enough argument to counter the view put forward by Mr Youde: that
we are not dealing with a "normal" situation and that we should above all avoid getting ourselves on to a moving staircase leading to a choice between our relations with Peking and our colonial responsibilities. То strengthen this argument it might be useful to show what Britain would lose economically and politically if we were to allow a situation in which Hong Kong's constitútional development provoked the Chinese into direct action against Hong Kong and into breaking off Sino-British trade. In theory at least if the cost to Britain itself were not very great we could consider the possibility of embarking on a policy of withdrawal of UK economic and other interests pari passu with constitutional advance if Hong Kong close a democratic path to independence/confrontation with Peking as being worth its while. A paper should surely show what we would suffer as well as Hong Kong itself.
8 March 1974
J.T. hare fold
JT Masefield Planning Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
(17293) 897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863