SECIL AND
MIGUNA
4.
The second problem is the type and extent of powers which the Members should exercise. You have rightly pointed out that your freedom to initiate new policies is paradoxically limited by the fact that the Hong Kong Government is not elected. We must be careful not to limit your scope still further by devolving important powers on non-elected people, who would expect freedom of action and could, within limits, enforce it by threat of resignation. The calculation is obviously a delicate one, since if they have no real powers and are seen to have none, then the appointments would serve no purpose. The balance should presumably be struck at a point which would give the new Members a degree of executive freedom, but preserve your constitutional and practical right to choose whether to follow their advice in policy matters.
5. This suggests that the constitutional position of ExCo (including the new Members), as being no more than advisory to the Governor, should remain unaltered. Similarly we should preserve the arithmetical balance in LegCo so that, with the Governor's casting vote, an official majority is retained. This means, I think, a majority of civil servants, since if the new Members were counted on the official side and the number of civil servants correspondingly reduced you would have an actual majority of local people on the Council. Our advice is that in these circumstances the Secretary of State's constitutional powers could only be assured by setting aside reserved powers for the Governor. This of course is a normal constitutional device in other Dependent Territories. But it is usually a clear step on the road to independence, and might well get us into trouble with the Chinese Government: and moreover it is a device that in practice can be called into operation only at the price of a political crisis.
There
6. A final question would be the terms of service of the new Members. Presumably they would work full time, and would be paid accordingly, at a rate comparable with, or just above, their senior officials. To operate efficiently they would have to be cleared to see most, though not all, papers. would also need to be some formal understanding about their share in the collective responsibility for Government's policy, so that their recourse, if they did not like that policy, would be resignation not criticism.
2.
SECRET AND PERSONAL
17.
A11