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it would be out.
3.
On 9 November the Secretary of State wrote to the Minister
for Trade and Consumer Affairs to say that the version of the new
Anglo/Italian proposals which we had seen,seemed to be much less
successful even than the Japanese in meeting Hong Kong's fundamental
conditions. He urged the need for improvements. We made the same
point again at departmental level on the same day. Mr Glaves-Smith
replied that although the Anglo/Italian group had improved its
proposals he thought we might find the draft still rather disappointing.
The proposals still lacked precision on prices which would be most
important in carrying the day in Hong Kong.
4.
On 19 November the Governor sent a personal message to the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry saying that he doubted
if Executive Council could advise opening negotiations with the
Anglo/Italian consortium as well as the Japanese on the basis of their
existing proposals. On 21 November the Secretary of State wrote again
to Mr Walker saying that he believed we must accept as a fact that,
from Hong Kong's point of view, our bid was at present defective both
in substance and in presentation. Mr Aston from Hong Kong chimed in
with a telegram to the DTI on 20 November reporting that the Governor
had sent for him to express his concern and to urge that everything
possible should be done to get representatives of the British group
to prepare a realistic counter-bid.
5.
On 24 November the Governor sent a further personal message
to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. On 26 November
Mr Walker himself acknowledged in a minute to the Secretary of State
that the Anglo/Italian consortium had until recently believed that
political arguments would be enough to sway the contract.
16.
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