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CONFIDENTIAL
proposal were extended to Burma, great political difficulties would arise, since the opium would have to be brought from the "White Flag" insurgents, from the Government itself, and from the hill tribes, each of which groups was hostile to the others. believe that this discussion has disposed of the proposal.
United Kingdom involvement in SE Asia
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17. At this point of the discussion the Americans openly asked that the United Kingdom should involve itself more closely in the South East Asian anti-drug activities and there was some criticism of our not having done so before. Without giving any indication that our Embassy in the region had been actively considering Rolph's proposals, I said that we were not ill-disposed to the American suggestion, but I stressed the need for the United Kingdom to be cautious about becoming too involved in the area at this particular time in view of our position upon the Ad Hoc Committee, I said that we did not wish to do anything which would prejudice the effectiveness of the United Nations involvement. Although inclined to criticise this vicw as being over-cautious, the Americans accepted the sense of it; they said that they saw the United Nations as being useful in developing common initiatives by countries in the region and in raising the general level of interest in the problem,
Trawler traffic
18. The third working session was concerned with the trawler traffic from Thailand to Hong Kong. The Americans made available a paper on this and other related subjects (Annex 2). The main problems were of identification and interception. The trawlers could be identified as being possible carriers of opiates only when they had left the Gulf of Thailand; from there northwards they were vulnerable until they mado rendezvous with the receiving junk south of the Lema islands. The problems were first to find them and then to try to board them during this period. Once their cargo had been offloaded to the small trawlers working out of Hong Kong, it was virtually impossible to intercept it except by chance, because of the enormous number of smell craft in the area. Consideration was given to the possibility of bugging the known or suspected trafficking trawlers with a view to some sort of tracking device being used at the liong Kong end. There were considerable technical problems involved in this, both in planting the device and tracking it. The Americans had on a couple of occasions got a "bug" on board a trawler, but had lost it. In the light of these discussions, I undertook to consider with scientists in the United Kingdom whether there were any surveillance techniques that might be used for this purpose.
19. Even if the trawlers could be identified, there was difficulty in getting aboard one in international waters. (The only success hitherto had been by South Vietnam when the trawler was in South Vietnamese territorial waters.) The Americans thought that there was a possibility that the Thais might be amenable to an approach from the United Kingdom Government suggesting that if a Thai trawler were found close to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Covernment should have the right to board it and search it, since it could not have any bona fide reason for being in the area.
20.
The Americans said that they had collected a great deal of information about the trawler traffic, and they thought that the time had come for a joint group to study and analyse the information that they had available with a view to proposing operations along the whole route. These would not be "joint operations" as such but they would be jointly planned. This suggestion was made at the end of the day with a view to further discussion of it at a later stage.
CONFIDENTIAL
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