0003160 G.F. 316
SECRET 高度機密
·3-
ECLIPSE
8.
The proposal is that any body to be set up should deal only with stopping the trawler traffic from Thailand, anyway at the beginning. Although this is probably the most important link in the illicit traffic, nevertheless it is limited in scope and perforce, as it is largely an external matter, what the United Kingdom or Hong Kong can do about it must be strictly limited. It is suggested that in our circumstances a two tier type of organisation is unnecessary and too cumbersome and furthermore that little is to be gainedby involving the United Kingdom in what is a purely local Far Eastern matter on the ground.
9.
This leaves a single H.K.-U.S. Liaison Group which needs to be looked at in the light of the Far East Ad Hoc Committee and the type of organisation which may emerge from its recommendations. At the moment a certain amount of intelligence about the trawler traffic is passed by the B.N.D.D. and U.S. Customs agents in Hong Kong to the Narcotics Bureau and the Preventive Service on an informal basis. The nature of this traffic is such that it is extremely unlikely that joint operations will ever be possible. The Americans, Thais and ourselves can only take such restricted action as may be within our power, unilaterally so far as Hong Kong is concerned, in the light of the intelligence to hand. There would appear to be room for an improved flow of intelligence about trawler movements and making better use of it after it is received. It would seem, therefore, that if we are to break away from the present informal arrangements, any bilateral Liaison Group should be confined to the exchange of intelligence and nothing more. A provision to this effect should be included in the ground rules,
10.
The Far East Ad Hoc Committee is going to be concerned directly with making recommendations to the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 1974 about the most suitable means of suppressing the illicit traffic in this region and promoting more effective cooperation and mutual assistance to this end. This will include the trawler traffic. The U.K. and Thailand are members of the Ad Hoc Committee, the U.S. is not, and neither will the latter be a member of any regional organisation which stems from the Ad Hoc Committee, though the U.K. and Thailand probably will be. However, no doubt the U.S. will have its views aired through Thailand. It is for consideration as to whether we should wait for the outcome of the Ad Hoc Committee before taking any bilateral Liaison Group further, or whether we should pursue the latter now without waiting for the Ad Hoc Committee and the decision of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs next year.
11.
Whatever organisation comes out the Ad Hoc Committee is almost bound to be of a formal nature, slow and possibly of limited effectiveness. It would appear that as the U.S. possessos the will and the resources, there will always be a need for the best possible exchange of intelligence between the U.S. and H.K. about the trawler traffic. It is concluded that the balance of advantage lies in forming a bilateral Liaison Group confined to exchanging intelligence about the trawler traffic on a regular and properly established basis.
SECRET 高度機密