54
explanation for this situation is found under the section of the report devoted to Burma.
Some crities of U.S. policy question the adequacy of U.S, narcoties assistance programs in Southeast Asia. They point out that, of the $20 son enn allerated for international narcoties assistance in fiscal year 1972, only $2,627,000 was programed for Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. In 1973, of the $42.5 million proposed for worldwide narcotics assistance programs. $3,122,000 will be expended in those countries. The following chart compares fiscal year 1972 worldwide programs with fiscal year 1973.
Africa
Algeria Tunisia..
Subtotal...
East Asia
Cambodia.
Indonesia.
Keres....
Laos..
PLANESIA.
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM
An thousands of dollars)
Proposed,
Estimated,
fiscal year 1972
Kscal year 1973 control
program
Revised, Escal year 1973
13
1,181
25
"723′′
Philistines..
230
Sing 10018.
Thland.
1,029
970
498
500
2,156
2,193
A
17
Vietnam..
Subtotal,
Latin America:
Arpenting..
Batumas.
Bothadas
Bolivia
PIAN
Chile..
Colombia.
Ecuada...
Guyana.
Jamuna,
Netherlands Antilles,
Panama...
Paraguay.
Peru.
Urzyw Venezuela.
19
4,382
པྤཱིཀཱིནིཔྤནྡྷནྡྷཐཱ།ཀྑཱུ། ཊྛཧྨཀྐཎྜནནྟཏྠེནཐདྡྷནྡྷ22སྟ8
1,300
35
On the other hand, the consensus among most US, narcotics oficials throughout Southeast Asia is that funding for narcoties a-sistance programs has been adequate. In their judgment, the expacity of the governments to absorb large amounts of financial and materiál assist- ance is limited and assistance programs for Southeast Asia should be based upon this reality.
Despite the fact that most ollicials are agreed that funds for pro- grams in Southeast Asia have been suflicient, there is friction between many narcoties control officials and several Agency for International Development officials over the kind of assistance that the United States should firmish.
For example, many US, officials, particularly BNDD, are critical of the way in which turcotics assistance programs are formulated and administered by the Agency for International Development. Accord- ing to these officials, AID does not understand the nature of the inter- ' national narcoties control assistance problem. The consensus was that, philosophically, AID thinks in terms of long-range development and that for this reason, the agency is slow to fund narcotics assistance programs which are not related to the long-term objective of institu- tion building. It is the view of these officials that the crisis nature of the drug abuse problem in the United States is so acute that funds must be expended on programs which will have an immediate impact. AID, on the other hand, argues that these criticistus are unwar- ranted and that the Agency will furnish assistance wherever and whenever it can be proved that such assistance can be effectively used. In the judgment of the survey team, these differences must be resolved at the White House level. Narcoties control assistance pro- grams cannot be eilective if bereaneratie tensions between BXDD and Customs, on the one hand, and AID, on the other, over the type of assistance that is to be furnished, are permitted to continue. The result would be a diminished effort and an eventual competition for funds.
In addition to bilateral assistance programs, the United States also contributes to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control.
Subtotal.
Mear East:
Josta. Real
36
2,663
75
Pakistan.
Stra...
Turkey..
Sub'o'al..
Worldwide propram:
Interreg oral costs. Training...
8
15, 700
15,000
15,000
15,700
15,000
15,045
--
25
350
2.000
U.M. Special Fund.
2,000
5,000
5,000
Subtotal..........
2,025
5,000
7,350
Subtotal, all programs,
20.617
22. 193
29,453
UndistributedİLLA-
20, 307
13, G47
Total program...............
20,617
42,500
42,500