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As important as bilateral programs are to the solution of the prob- Jems, in the final analysis the suppression of narcotics in Southeast Asia will require regional cooperation. To attack it, therefore, requires coor- dination between narcotics law enforcement officials of all countries in the area.
The United States is attempting to encourage regional cooperation in Southeast Asia through the Regional BNDD Office which is lo- cated in Bangkok. While there has been little success in these efforts and the results are not yet satisfactory, several countries are developing an awareness of the need to esordinate activities and to exchange information.
BXDD agents in Southeast Asia also work closely with U.S. Customis officials stationed in the area.
U.S. BUREAC OF CUSTOMS
Briefly stated, the role of the U.S. Bureau of Customs is to prevent the illegal entry of narcoties into the United States.
It is the contention of V.S. Customs that the best place to interdict the flow of narcotics is at the U.S. border. As several Customs officials explained, "the bottleneck in narcotics smuggling is at the U.S. border and this is the best place to attack the problem.” This has not proved to be completely effective, however, for in spite of intensified inspection and examination procedures, an unknown quantity of heroin slips by Customs and enters the United States each year. As part of its pro- gram to impede the illegal flow of narcotics the United States has offered Customs assistance to foreign countries (1) to improve in- spection and screening of traffic at lawful points of entry and exit; and (2) to prevent smuggling at border and coastal points and interior air strips.
U.S. Customs agents are stationed in several countries around the world, including Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam. These agents advise and assist local customs officials and in Laos conduct inspections and examinations of aireraft personnel and baggage entering or leav- ing the country. In addition. U.S. Customs agents participate in border patrol operations along the Mekong River in the Golden Triangle. And in March 1972 Customs began re/ruiting 25 agents with intelligence experience to collect data on smuggling operations abroad. These agents are being assigned to principal opiumn source countries or at key points along the sunggling routes to the United States. (At. the time the Survey Team was in Southeast Asia, Customs intelligence personnel were in Laos and South Vietnam but not in Thailand.)
According to several Customs officials in Southeast Asia and in Washington, the maison d'être for establishing an intelligence collection capability was that “BXDD did not share all of the intelligence that it collected.” One particularly out-poken official said, “BNDD is not likely to work on behalf of Customs. As a result it was decided to send our own intelligence agents overseas.” Unfortunately, like many BNDD agents overseas, all of those Customs intelligence officials do not speak the language of the country in which they are stationed,
On the other hand, BXDD officials complained that Customs is "not entirely forthcoming with a lot of the information that they get. BNDD does not receive a regular flow of intelligence from Customs.”
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It is leplorable that this situation exists. The ultimate objective is to stop heroin from reaching the addicts and it will require the whole- hearted participation and cooperation of all parties and agencies in volved. The dimensions of the problem are such that the United States cannot afford the luxury of interagency friction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
In war, intelligence on the activities of the enemy is vital. This is especially true of the war on narcotics where the entire process is clandestine. Poppies are grown illegally. Opium is purchased from the grower covertly, processed in illicit laboratories and smuggled across national borders in violation of international and national laws. Prior to the establishment of the Cabinet Committee, nareotics in- telligence was the responsibility of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan- gerous Drugs. This was an unsatisfactory arrangement. The view of several U.S. oficials was that BNDD agents were not trained to handle the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intel- ligence. As a result, a lot of good intelligence went largely unused.
To remedy this situation and to improve the quality of intelligence, the President directed the Central Intelligence Agency to give nar- cotics intelligence collection a major priority. The Agency has done this.
It is the consensus among most officials with whom the Survey Teain met, in and out of the intelligence community, that the inclusion of CIA in the narcoties intelligence collection effort was necessary. The Agency has the expertise, the resources, and the contacts that ËNDD and Customs do not have. These same officials are concerned, however, that the requirement to participate in the narcoties intelligence effort will interfere with the Agency's capability in other areas. This con- cern is valid. While CIA was given the responsibility, the Agency was not authorized additional personnel, and overall funding was reduced. In Southeast Asia, the CIA has been given the responsibility for coordinating the narcoties intelligence collection activities of the vari- ous U.S. Missions.
To prevent any of the agencies engaged in collecting intelligence on narcotics from using the same informers, the CIA provides coordi- nated intelligence support. This enables then to monitor the program and insure maximum effectiveness with a minimum amount of con- fusion and duplication.
Domestically, a Central Intelligence Agency official serves as Chair- man of the Cabinet Committee's Working Group Subcommittee on Foreign Intelligence. The purpose of this subcommittee is to coordi- nate the foreign intelligence collection effort at the Washington level and to develop collection guidelines for the field. The subcommittee conducts its activities on an informal rather than organizational basis. As a result, a working relationship has developed among the individ- ual representatives of its more important components; i.c., CIA, BNDD, and Customs.
In the past, the Agency has produced a number of Intelligence Memoranda on various aspects of the international narcotics problems, for the use of the Department of State, BNDD. Customs, and other agoncies. While there are no such documents being produced at the
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