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This burning was witnessed by two BNDD officials, the Regional Director for Southeast Asia and a forensic chemist.
According to BNDD, the opium was wrapped in balls weighing between 185 and 191 pounds. The balls were wrapped in leaves, paper, and plastic and sealed in 319 burlap bags.
The BNDD representatives sampled each of the bags by randomly cutting into each with a knife and withdrawing a small amount of the contents with a wooden applicator stick. Each stick was placed in a test tube and later examined under a microscope.
BNDD officials insist that the bags contained opium and that the opium was completely destroyed.
After the burning, it was alleged that only 5 of the 26 tons consisted of opium.
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BNDD called a press conference on August 1, 1972, and denied the allegations. Included in the press conference was a 20-minute film which showed both Thai and U.S. officials inspecting the opium prior to burning.
Another U.S. official present in Chiang Mai corroborated the fact that the opium had been checked prior to burning by both Thai and BNDD officials. He was also certain that all the bags had contained opium. According to this official, Thai customs inspected the opium in the mountains of Thailand first and BNDD then inspected it after it had been brought down to Chiang Mai.
A high ranking Thai official also contends that the Chinese turned over 26 tons and that it was all opium. According to this official, the Chinese actually brought 27 tons of opium to the turn-in point, but Thai and U.S. authorities refused to accept the additional ton of opium. Instead the CIF were ordered to get the extra ton of opium out of Thailand. It is unfortunate that there is no official explanation available which would indicate what actually did happen to the 27th ton of opium. It could have been returned to Burma or it could have been smuggled to Bangkok, Hong Kong, or elsewhere.
When questioned as to why 1 ton of opium was refused, both Thai and U.S. officials told the Survey Team that there was no additional money authorized to pay for the extra ton and that they did not wish to negotiate further with Li and Tuan lest the whole deal fall through. For this reason, 1 ton of opium was returned to the Chinese.
One aspect of this case which should be given critical attention is the precedent that has been established. Regardless of explanations about resettlement the transaction involved paying $1 million for opium. To many this constitutes a preemptive buy which could en- courage more opium production, not less. Under some circumstances such buys may be necessary. As a general rule, however, it is a danger- ous practice and should be avoided.
The success of the agreement depends upon whether the Chinese will abide by their part of the bargain and stay out of the opium business. At this point, it is debatable whether the project can suc- ceed. Many CIF officers and men question the wisdom of entering into such an agreement and a large number have refused to accept the con-
* One BNDD official stated that an informer had told him that the bags had contained 70 percent opium and 30 percent fodder. It was not possible to refute or substantiate the accuracy of this statement although all of the Thai and U.S. officials contacted by the Survey Team substantiated the details as set forth above.
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