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Narcotics and arms are smuggled into Laos along the Mekong by many of the dissidents and other groups operating in the Golden Triangle. They have been and probably still are being smuggled out of Laos on Royal Lao Air Force aircraft, on Lao and other commercial aircraft, by trucks, automobiles and by foot and caravan. An example of some of the problems faced by the GSI in Laos is the case of Maj. Chao La, a Yao irregular force leader who is located in Houa Khong Province.
Chao La has written that he has 3,000 kilos of opium that he is willing to sell to the Lao Government. The Lao Government does not want to purchase the opium and has approached the United States, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom asking if they would buy the opium. Simultaneously the Prime Minister ordered Chao La to turn the opium over to the Provincial Governor, Chao Khoueng. Chao La, who does not trust the Provincial Governor, refused to turn over the opium as ordered and the Lao Government has issued instruc- tions that the opium is not to be seized. The plan is to wait until it has been decided which government will make the preemptive buy of the opium. All governments concerned are reluctant to encourage such a practice. They are fearful that once preemptive buying starts, it will encourage farmers to produce more opium for sales to those govern- ments at constantly increasing prices. Paying premium prices for a product which is as valuable on the illegal market as is opium can only encourage those who deal in opium to cater to both the licit and the illicit markets.
For example, according to U.S. authorities in Ban Houei Sai, Chao La needs money. He owes the Chinese irregulars cash, which he does not have, for services rendered (probably for convoying opium from Burma into Laos). Opium is not moving on the illicit market and stocks are piling up in warehouses in Tachilek as well as in Chao La's village.
Chao La wants to sell 3,000 kilos of opium (which will yield 660 pounds of heroin). The Lao Government does not believe that the Yao could have produced more than 1,000 kilos of opium and that the remaining 2,000 kilos have been obtained in Burma.
If the latter estimate is true, a governmental buy of the opium would have the effect of "bailing out" those in Burma who are having trouble moving the opium into and through Laos and Thailand.
If the precedent established in Thailand where the United States purchased 26 tons of opium for $1 million is followed in Laos, the results could be disastrous. Opium is not in short supply and produc- tion in Burma alone is estimated to be about 400 tons per year.
The Government of Laos and Thailand have both established nar- cotics control organizations and there have been some initial successes. Lo Hsing-han and others are having trouble moving their opiates and as a result can be expected to seek other smuggling routes. Already there is evidence to suggest that some opiates are being moved westward through Burma into Bangladesh where conditions are chaotic and governmental control in many parts of the country almost nonexistent.
What could be a better way to finance these operations than to sell opium to governments that are concerned with the problems created by
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