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probably be better that the officer be designated simply as a member of Chancery rather than as having formal responsibility for Narcotics Control.
We are not convinced, however, that such an officer would have a useful full-time job to do. The Americans have already undertaken to make available to us any information they have, or may acquire in the future, about the drug control position in Thailand. As they already have narcotics control officers working with the Thais both in the North and in Bangkok it is difficult to believe that one officer in the British Embassy could compete with them in the acquisition of knowledge. The same consideration applies to the suggestion in (g) for the attachment of a Hong Kong officer to the "SNO Programme".
(h) We would support an examination in depth of the whole question of the smuggling of drugs to Hong Kong from Thailand by Thai fishing trawlers with a view to achieving a formula in which international action could be taken to apprehend the vessels. We should, however, need to approach the Thais to secure their agréement- before taking any further action.
(i) We see no objection to discussion, with the US in the first instance, of the suggestion to create an opium monopoly in Thailand. We do not, however, believe that the suggestion will find favour with the Thais who, having embarked on a suppression and crop substitution programme on the grounds that the cultivation and sale of opium are illegal, would lose considerable face if they were now to go into reverse. In the very unlikely event of their doing so, such is the climate of corruption here that opium would still find its way on to the illegal market.
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i