included Mr. LLOYD, despite the fact that since 5th March 1973 he has been Commandant of the Police Tactical Unit at Fanling and, it would appear, his duties do not require that he be in possession of a permit. The list of 48 also includes the name Peter F. GODBER.
GODBER was issued with a permanent permit shortly after he assumed his duties as 2nd-in-command of Kowloon District in December 1971. Mr. Kee-bee KнOO, the Airport Manager (Passenger Services) informed me that he had not received any request to cancel GODBER's permanent permit; and, on 8th June 1973, I must presume that GODBER was in possession of that permit. The duplicate copy of the permit kept by the Airport General Manager was produced to the Commission. It is a "red" permit i.e. it conferred a general authority to GODBER to cross the air/land barrier. It bears the figures 1-6; and none of those numbers had been blanked out. In other words, he had unrestricted right of access to all parts of the airport.
One has to remember that although, by 8th June, rumours were rife that a police officer was under investiga- tion by the Anti-Corruption Office-indeed many persons may have had a fairly good idea as to his identity- GODBER'S name had not been published. Clearly, this was due to the inhibiting effect of s. 30 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance which reads:-
"30. Any person who, without lawful authority or excuse, discloses to any person who is the subject of an investigation in respect of an offence alleged or suspected to have been committed by him under this Ordinance the fact that he is subject to such an investigation or any details of such investigation, or discloses to any other person either the identity of any person who is the subject of such an investigation or any details of such an investigation, shall be liable on conviction to a fine of $20,000 and to imprison- ment for one year."
The result was that between the 4th and the 11th June, no Government Department could divulge the fact that the police investigation regarding GODBER had reached an advanced stage; and, equally, the Press were precluded from mentioning GODBER's name, even if, through their own efforts, they knew that GODBER was under investigation.
Therefore, I cannot presume that anyone was on the lookout for GODBER. The Immigration officers, of course, should have been on the lookout for anyone who presented a passport no. 57699 and bearing the photograph of the holder. But that is all. And it is a fact that no one has been found who actually saw GODBER enter any restricted area on 8th June 1973.
I have myself visited Kai Tak Airport; and I am clearly of the opinion that, armed with his official permit, there were a number of ways in which GODBER could have reached the transit/departure lounge without passing through Immigration Control in the normal way. But, in my view, his most probable route was through the west gate (gate no. 5) which is near the V.I.P. Room. The main gate at that point is kept shut to vehicles most of the time; and a pedestrian must pass through the narrower gate where there should be a police constable on duty. However, Mr. SCEATS, Counsel for the Commission, informed me that when he visited the airport when inter- viewing witnesses, on one occasion he walked through this small gate, unaccompanied by any authorised person, without being challenged; and he was not in possession of any kind of a permit! However, even assuming that a very alert and efficient constable happened to be on duty at 1.45 or 2 p.m. on 8th June, that would not have pre- sented any problem to the 2nd-in-command, Kowloon District armed with a red permit. It is true that the constable who was in fact on duty that afternoon cannot remember seeing GODBER; but that is hardly surprising considering the number of persons who pass in and out in the normal course. The constable's main concern is to check that the person desirous of passing into the restricted area is wearing his permit on his chest. Again, one has to bear in mind that, at the material time, the constable had no official reason to suspect that GODBER was under investiga- tion or on the Immigration Department Watch List.
Immediately inside this gate is the end of the west "finger" or ramp which, after a short walk, leads directly into the departure/transit lounge where a person can easily mingle with the other passengers.
I do not think that it is necessary in this report to enumerate and describe the various other possible ways in which a person, armed with a "red" permit, could have reached the transit/departure lounge. So far as GODBER is concerned, they all involved a very considerable risk of being recognised by someone. For example, in the customs inspection hall there are uniformed and special branch officers patrolling the area.
Of course, I cannot say with certainty that he did not pass through Immigration in the normal way. It is possible that he had made some arrangement with a member of the Immigration staff to destroy his departure card as soon as he passed through. But there was not a shred of evidence to support collusion of this kind.
Another possibility is that out of the 14 or 15 Immigration channels available, the Immigration officer at the one chosen by GODBER may have made a mistake by overlooking the name "GODBER" on the Watch List, and, later realising his mistake, he may have destroyed the departure card to cover his tracks. But, in my view, this is
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