CONFIDENTIAL
question, and that these views will remain unchanged.
This implies a need for even closer liaison between
us.
4.
This we can achieve.
لله
remains
I fear there is lee in the background an
obvious possibility of difficulty for you with if in a specific case you decide that you could not, in the craintances Afcutive Souncil if our consultations in specific of Hong Kong, grant a reprieve, despite the probability of scrops trouble in parhainent. Ore de reveale strong probability of serious
This could have all the
senous consequence
le with Parliament But
but meet this
and I take it that the argument
would be
that the worst thing for Hong Kong a row in
would
Parliament, will not be wholly ineffective 1 it
used early enough. ト
--
described in paragraph
Sof your taking an No 788,
But at
(in Executive and this stage we can! do no more than note the imporid
5. I imagine that you will want to show my other
letter to some of your senior advisers, including
of wording thi pictuation;
members of Executive Council. This is why I have
split my comments in two. But this does bring up
the question of what, if anything, we should say in
public. Both we and you will doubtless be asked
about the position. A statement that the present
banco hast boom there was to be
no charge
in the law
would doubtless have a beneficial
effect in the Hong Kong, and it another
execution
Wint
6
does take place you
You will
in advance that it
does not take people by surprise. But equally
anoid
um neces
row in this country, and
would be
But a statement of this kind
'I was
doubly dangerous it it
in fact followed
we should
by a further reprieve by the Queen. It is difficult to whish the advantages without being certain of the future. But I do
not think
I therefore myfest that that was leave the question of public statements over for discussion with you here,
we need hung this.
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