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I fear there still remains in the background an obvious possibility of difficulty if in a specific case you decide that you could not, in the circumstances of Hong Kong, grant a reprieve, despite the probability of serious trouble in Parliament. This could have all the serious consequences described in paragraph 5 of your telegram number 788. this stage we can do no more than note the importance of avoiding this situation; and I take it that the argument that the worst thing for Hong Kong would be a row in Parliament, might not be wholly ineffective in Executive Council if it was used early enough.
But at
I imagine that you will want to show my other letter to some of your senior advisers, including members of Executive Council. This is why I have split my comments in two. But this does bring up the question of what, if anything, we should say in public. Both we and you will doubtless be asked about the position. A statement that there was to be no change in the law would doubtless have a beneficial effect in Hong Kong; and against the possibility of a future execution, it would be desirable to ensure in advance that people were not taken by surprise. But equally it could give rise to an unnecessary renewal of controversy in this country, and we have to think too of the possible consequences if it were in fact to be followed by a further reprieve by The Queen. It is difficult to weigh the choice. But I do not think we need hurry this. I therefore suggest, unless you think otherwise, that we leave the question of public statements over for discussion with you here, and that meanwhile you stress to your advisers that whatever you tell them is in strict confidence and is not to go further.
Jus ev
s ever
(Duncan Watson)