TOP SECRET
e in power.
Although Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-
Lai will be dead before 1997, Chinese Governments
are disposed in practice to follow agreements made
by their predecessors, witness their present
1
acceptance of the New Territories leasessments
staff are inclined to think that we should take this present chance rather
5. But we cannot yet be sure whether the
objective of an agreement or understanding for us
to stay beyond 1997 may not be attainable in the
future. Moreover, any discussions with the Chinese
would be likely to become public knowledge, and
San
an agreement for an orderly withdrawal would be
damased worse than valueless if it did not promete present
There is a risk of this public confidence in Hong Kong. It could become
•Something be in whosed unere com Beccariful. Th
Jedwabie
which would
nervousness about a possible
has become
disorderly or earlier takeover was more real than
the fear of the deadline. But
this is not yet the
case.
Although therefore there are risks in
inaction, the balance of advantage is still to wait.
6.
These considerations do, however, underline
the importance of timing and the continuing need
for an annual review. I submit a draft DOPC paper
accordingly. Far Eastern Department and Planning
Staff agree, and the paper's conclusions have been
agreed with the Assessments Staff.
7. The Secretary of State commented on the
previous paper that we should be particularly
careful about its security. We will arrange
specially limited distribution for the new one,
and I would be grateful if copies of this draft,
other than the original, could be destroyed after
+
reading.
than submit to the uncertain Suture
Qre replace (which mist hoppt before very
long). Their
successors, moreover,
woned be more likel.
vecke
agues
Create Then the Oral
under Oki on which we now rel.
+ a ac
า
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
oùed feir
agremeni
se for reponiction only becondo reoly vivots
when
Page 75Page 76