TOP SECRET DOFC TAPER
7. Moreover confidence and the viability of Hong
Kong depend to an important extent on what people
think is the policy of China. If, therefore, the
Chinese Government again became overtly hostile
before 1997, we could be forced by a decline in
public confidence to approach them at a time when
there would be little chance of an agreement. We
should therefore not rule out the possibility of
opening talks with the Chinese at a comparatively
early date if we see a real chance of concluding an
agreement or understanding which would give us
greater security of tenure.
8. If we approached the Chinese Government now,
we might in the present climate be able to agree on
an orderly withdrawal in 1997, but not on our
retention of the Colony beyond that date. There is
a risk that, by waiting for a more favourable oppor-
tunity, we might lose the chance of any agreement.
But an agreement now to withdraw in 1997 could itself
be destabilising if it became public knowledge, and
could therefore defeat its own purpose. A chance of
a more favourable agreement might come either before
or after the death of the present leaders.
balance of advantage is still to wait.
The
9. 1 therefore conclude that the recommendations
of DOP(71)83 are still valid, but that we should
continue to keep them under annual review. I invite
my colleagues to concur.