Mr Stuart
CONFIDENTIAL
Secret
Reference
する
SPAIN/GIBRALTAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG/CHINA OF NEW PROPOSALS
1.
I should record, belatedly, that, whilst Sir M MacLehose was here, I did briefly discuss with him the matter covered in my minute of 7 August to Mr Larmour. The Governor agreed with the sort of implications which I foresaw in that minute. He did not, however, think that it was necessary to take them particularly seriously. If we reached an accord with Spain on the lines envisaged, there might be comment in the Hong Kong press and parallels might be drawn, particularly by expatriates. But he did not think that the Chinese would take the precedent very seriously, and certainly did not consider that any implications for Hong Kong should be allowed to stand in the way of an agreement over Gibraltar and Spain.
18 September 1973
Cc:
Mr Goodison (SED)
Mr Clark (FED) Mr Donohoe (G & GD)
R.M. Loo
R B Crowson
Suret
CONFIDENTIAL
DD 145177 219242 500M 4,73 GM_3643/2
Mr Wilford PS/Mr Royle
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Agreed
we didn't
need
me
Miss Kelly for briet
A
12
Yes.
GIBRALTAR:
THE DIALOGUE WITH SPAIN
1. In your Minute of 15 August you asked for comments on the
effect in Hong Kong of the new proposals for a solution of the
Gibraltar question.
2.
Before receiving your Minute Mr Crowson had already sent
Mr Larmour the preliminary views of Far Eastern Department and
this Department on the implications for Hong Kong/China of the
new proposals. A copy of Mr Crowson's Minute of 7 August is
attached. The precedent of an agreement with Spain could indeed
be useful if and when we ever get into a discussion about the
future of Hong Kong. But since Ministers have decided that this
X MH.K is not the time for such discussion and that public speculation
on the question could itself be harmful, then the precedent
would at this moment be an awkward one. I agree that it would be
helpful to discuss this with the Governor. I do not know if
Mr Crowson did talk to Sir M MacLehose (both are on leave), but
it would be worth raising the point at Mr Royle's meeting on
11 September.
23 August 1973
cc:
Sir D Watson
an not sure
how
A C Stuart
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department
for the Spanish precedent is
bery pursued, but it calenly
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IS
relevant to us.
Kun Wilfor
7
1
Mr Larmour
with /12
fill
viin dail.
1
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SPAIN/GIBRALTAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG/CHINA OF NEW PROPOSALS
1. Mr Donohoe has told me that you would like an early view of the implications, if any, on the relationship between Hong Kong and China of the new proposals for Gibraltar. As I understand it, the proposal would be that HMG would recognize Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, but that the territory would continue to be administered by HMG under a perpetual lease, terminable at the instance of the Gibraltarians, perhaps on the basis of referenda at 10 year intervals. There would also be some kind of Spanish representation in Gibraltar, though not connected with the administration.
2. This is at least as much a matter for Far Eastern Department as it is for us. I have discussed the question briefly with them, and what follows is our joint first reaction. To produce a considered view would take longer than the time I understand to be available at present.
3. The UK view of the constitutional position is as follows. Under the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, Hong Kong Island was ceded by China to Britain in perpetuity. Under the Convention of Peking, 1860, the Kowloon Peninsular, together with certain islands, was similarly ceded. Under the New Territories Lease of 1898, the New Territories (by far the greater part of the land area) were leased by China to Britain for 99 years. The Chinese, however, do not necessarily accept the validity of these treaties, which they consider to have been unequal ones imposed on a weak and divided China by an imperialist power. They maintain that the whole of Hong Kong is an integral part of China, temporarily under our administration.
4.
In the short term, the proposals for Gibraltar might have an adverse effect on Hong Kong's position vis-à-vis China. Recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar might encourage the Chinese to press us to accept their view that the whole of Hong Kong was an integral part of China. Equally if not more important, if the Spaniards were allowed to appoint a representative in Gibraltar, this might encourage the Chinese to step up the pressure on us to agree to some form of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong. They have been asking for this for some time now, but have been told by the Secretary of State that we cannot agree. The Hong Kong Government see grave objections to the proposal; they think that a Chinese representative might be a form of second Governor. These short term objections should be taken into account in proposals over Gibraltar, but neither I nor FED think that, of themselves, they need be a bar to them.
15.
A
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71
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