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9. It would not be easy for Ministers to give any blanket
assurance for a fixed period, particularly in the light of the
DOPC decision, which implies that the trigger for changing the
law (if at all) must be the circumstances of a particular case.
It may be that the only way to reconcile this decision with the
Governor's need for certainty over an extended period is to
accept as a theoretical option that, if there had to be a change
of policy soon after an execution, only a new Governor, not
involved in the original decision, could carry this through
successfully in Hong Kong. This is no more than a remote
possibility. It is in practice likely that a decision to support
the Governor, once taken in the light of all the circumstances,
would be maintained.
THE BALANCE OF RELATIONS WITH HONG KONG
10. The Governor has asked that we should bear in mind the
cumulative effect of decisions by HMG which Hong Kong regard as
damaging. There are at the moment several such points of
friction. Examples, covered in the briefs, are the future of
(Flung C)
(Flag B)
the Sterling Agreements Hong Kong and the EEC
(Flag D)
general textiles
policy, the death penalty, the return of Mr Godber, the nationality question and air traffic rights to Hong Kong. He
accepts that dispute on some of these questions is inevitable,
an because of the underlying conflict of interests. He agrees with
us that to mitigate these cumulative effects we might ask
Ministers to consider these topics together, and to agree that,
where vital UK concerns are not involved, concessions to Hong
/Kong
- 3.
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