(17259) Dd.897459 250m 12/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863 (16941) Dd.897300 250m 9/72 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863
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1. Sir Murray MacLehose said that when the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry was in Hong Kong Sir
Fold hamm
Murray had said that, if it was clear that the British
consortium might be about to lose the contract, he would
Let
know.
es, us This point had now arisen. He himself had
not been able to see Mr Walker but Mr Haddon-Cave had
done so. Mr Walker's response had been that the
competitors of the UK consortium were being illegally
subsidised. This was not in fact the trouble. The
electrical and mechanical parts of the British consortium
bid were sound and the proposed financial arrangements
were attractive. The weak link was the civil engineering
side. They were worried about varying tunnelling
conditions in Hong Kong and were not prepared to give
a fixed price. But the other consortia were quite
ready to do so. Sir Murray MacLehose had now taken it
on himself to explain the situation to Lord Aldington.
that The right deduction might be that the viable
elements of a British consortium should now team up
with others who were good where the UK were weak. He
thought Lord Aldington might ring up his contacts in
Rome. The Italians were the best tunnellers in the
world and an Italian/British consortium would be very
strong.
2. The Hong Kong negotiators had stipulated that
there must be a ceiling price. If the UK's competitors
were able to accept this why could not a British
consortium do so? He remained convinced that British
contractors should have as large a share of the project
as possible. The main danger was a pre-emptive Japanese
bid.
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