2. None of these examples is necessarily a good
guide of Chinese conduct on the representation of
Hong Kong in ECEAFE. The United Kingdom (and Hong
Kong) objective must be to keept as low a profile
as possible. If the Chinese delegate corfines
himself to making a statement for the record about
the status of Hong Kong, the most we would wish to
do wold be to issue a quiet counter-statement.
As present Chinese policy is to leave matters as
they are over Hong Kong, it is possible that they
will do no more than this. But if China pursues
the issue, and objects fundamentally to Hong Kong's
separate representation in ECEAFE there are two
possible fallback positions: the first is to argue
that only ECOSOC has the power to alter the present
position (but we cannot be sure that ECOSOC itself
would support Hong Kong); or to subsume Hong Kong's
representation in that of the United Kingdom in
line with her representation in other UN bodies
(but this has practical disadvantages and would be
a humiliating retreat for Hong Kong.
3. The first United Kingdom objective must be to
ensure that Hong Kong's voice continues to be
heard in ECEAFE. The United Kingdom delegation
should therefore report by immediate telegram any
rules which the Chinese may make to unseat her.
If the Chinese should take up a position more
extreme than a simple protest for the record the
United Kingdom delegation should, in consultation with
the Hong Kong representation, formally reserve our
position and seek immediate instructions.
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