LAOS
Deep deadlock
By A Correspondent
ne: A political settlement in Laos us now two months overdue, and is still not in sight. Although fighting is now aluósi completely at an end, the Goverment and the Pathet Lau cannot agree on the sharing of political power.
The February ceasefire agreement said the new government would be inade up equally of Vientiane and Pathet Lao representatives, plus a prime minister: if there were twelve cabinet positions, each side would take six. But it is generally assumed here that Prince Souvanna Phouma, Premier since 1964, will be the new prime minister, and the Pathet Lao claims that this would, in effect, give Vientiane an extra cabinet seat. To offset this, it wants a Pathet Lao representative to be appointed vice- premier, adding that he could be drawn. from its six cabinet members. Although there is no mention of such a position in the agreement, the Pathet Lao argues that it is customary for governments to have a deputy leader, and that this is only fair in the circumstances. If there is to be no vice-premier, the Pathet Lac will naturally lay claim to the premier- ship. This is one point of deadlock.
Another concerns the distribution of four key ministries: Foreign Affairs, De- fence, Interior, and Finance. Vientiane will accept a Pathet Lao representative as fo.eign minister, but insists on keep- ing the other three. The Pathet Lao says the four should be divided equally, each with a deputy from the other side, in ac- cordance with the spirit of the Agree ment. Thus there is deadlock again. The Pathet Lao charges that the Vientiane side only wants to reshuffle or enlarge the old government, rather than form a
new one.
Finally, there is disagreement over how to implement a provision of the agreement which says that the main towns of Vientiane and Luang Prabang, where the new government is likely to function (usually in Vientiane, but go- ing up to Luang Prabang periodically to consult the King), should be neutralised. The Pathet Lao argues that if Vientiane franys are to remain in these towns an qual contingent of Pathet Lao troops should be brought in. Vientiane replies that this would not be fair since no Vientiane troops can enter the Pathet Lao zone - and suggests that each side maintain a small but equal police con- tingent in the two towns.
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These are only the most important
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
difficulties in the way of a political set- tlement. Long delays are perhaps not surprising when it is recalled that this is the third attempt in the past 20 years to form a viable coalition government in Laos; both previous attempts broke down within a year. But each side claims the other is deliberately stalling in mder to play for time while its allies (the US, Thieu, Lon Nol; Hanoi, the PRO, FUNK ) Consolidate their respec- tive positions or, in the case of Cambo dia, continue combai. These charges be- come plausible insofar as the February agreement says that all foreign military personnel must be withdrawn from Laos, and the CIA's “special forces" dis- banded, within 60 days of the forma tion of the new provisional government. Clearly, as long as fighting continues in Cambodia, each side has an interest in delaying the implementation of this pro- vision. The February agreement pro- bably represents the fairest possible basis for a Laotian peace, but if ultimate agreement must await a resolution of the Cambodian situation it is likely that the current deadlock will continue, and de facto partition of the country into two zones, each with a separate adminis- tration, wili simply be prolonged.
The root of the problem, according to the Pathet Lao, is American deter- mination not to disengage from South- cast Asia. To this end, it says, the US is reinforcing its client régimes in Bang- kok, Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane while stepping up the war in Cambodia. In Laos it is encouraging right-wing poli- ticians (specifically the Sananikone group) and generals to "sabotage" the February agreement.
For example, the Front insists that the Vientiane side has never given the ceasefire order to its troops and, until checked by successful counter-attacks, made serious thrusts into Pathet Lao- held territory despite the ceasefire-in- place. On three occasions, this drew a stinging US response B-52 raids on Paksong and the surrounding area (February 23), and on the area south- west of the Plain of Jars (April 16-17). US planes still fly over the Pathet Lao zone almost daily, and Thai pilots fly T-28s (with Laotian markings) over Lacs daily from US bases at Udorn and
Likon in Thailand
So the present battlefield calm re- mains fragile. Former US ambassador to Laos G. Mcmurtrie Godley has disclosed to a US Senate subcommittee that there are still some 15,000 Thai troops in Laos trained, organised and paid by the CIA and there appear to be no immediate plans to withdraw them. Ia
fact there are rumours that the Vien tiane government hopes to absorb some of them into its armed forces. In addi. tion, rigiust generais are hoping that the rainy season which begins soon will cause the lathet Lao supply difficulties.
All the indications are that progress in the political negotiations in Vien- tiane, and moves towards a fumer basis for the conseffic, now depaid on the situation in neighbouring Cambodia and South Vienam.
HONGKONG
The McKinsey Report
By Leo Goodstadt Hongkong: For the sum of HK$2.6 mil- lion, voted in 1972 to finance a review of the machinery of government, Hong- kong's Legislative Council last week re- ceived a 20-page report from the con- sultants retained, McKinsey & Co. At $130,000 a page, every word of the published report must be goiden.
The McKinsey report gets off to a good start. The main problem, it rightly argues, is the limited number of skilled and experienced officials to cope with a mounting workload. The report thus aims mainly at reducing the volume of decisions which have to be made at the top. This, logically, involves major issues being handled by the junior echelons. But if a shortage of experienced talent exists at the top, the situation must be rather worse lower down the ladder. This point is not dweit upon by the con-
sultants.
The McKinsey report claims, quite reasonably, that most government acti- vities cannot be evaluated in the profit- and-loss terms of 2 business concern. But the chief recommendation which the consultants appear to believe will pressure the Civil Service to improve its efficiency is the examination of unit costs of the Government's operations. How cost effectiveness is to be used to improve the hospital services of the colony, apart from restraints on increas ed spending per patient, is not a subjeer on which the report wastes many words.
As forecast by the REVIEW (INTELLIGENCE, May 14) the most dramatic innovation recommended by the coneuitante is the establishmant of six "overlords.” under whom related de. partments will be grouped to allow greater delegation of authority, expedit ing decisions on plans to build a new road or buy more fire engines, for exam- ple. Such a system covering key areas of the administration (social services in particular) actually exists but provides
MAY 28, 1973
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