CONFIDENTIAL
3
20.
I told him that the British Government had already informed Peking that they would vote for the Albanian Resolution as they had done ever since it was first introduced about 10 years ago and would not support any device likely to delay the transfer to Peking of the China seat. That, I said, met all Peking's requirements.
21.
22.
Mr. Tam agreed.
I added that it would be a great convenience to everybody, including Mr. Nixon, if this issue of the China seat in the U.N. could be settled in the next two months.
23.
Mr. Tam took his leave with further expressions of courtesy. He also said that if they had any problems over the distribution of the 3 million yuan he would get in touch with me.
24.
The visit had lasted about half an hour.
COMMENTS:
25.
Although some of Mr. Tam's remarks may appear to be rather awkward or needling, his style was very easy and friendly and the general impression given by his visit was that he was not trying to be difficult.
26.
It is not clear what was the purpose of his visit. He had no specific request to make in connection with the gift from China. It seems most likely that the communists wanted to find out at this early stage whether the Hong Kong Government was likely to raise any difficulties to their distribution of the money, possibly remembering the trouble they had had in 1968 when they wanted to bring in rice.
27.
Another motive might have been the desire to raise the NCNA to a quasi-consular status. By visiting me in my office and behaving in a thoroughly polite and reasonable way Mr. Tam did in fact act rather like a consular representative. There are obviously limits beyond which such a development would not be acceptable to us.
(A F Maddocks)
P.A.
25.8.71
CONFIDENTIAL