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Points (a) and (b) above are an attempt to explain why it has taken Hong Kong so long to make its preparations before asking for consultations. Point (c) alleges that the tariff decision was taken "without the prior consultations that had been promised". We regard this as a bit of a distortion. The furthest we went was to tell posts, including Hong Kong, at the time of the publication of the Textile Council's report, that HMG was not committed to the proposed line; and "the many interests involved in this matter (including those of overseas suppliers) will be taken into account in the months to come when the Report will be under consideration." This is very different from a promise to hold consulta- tions. The truth of the matter is that the Hong Kong authorities are still annoyed with themselves that they did not get around to making representations to HMG in the interval between the publication of the Report (March 1969) and the Crosland statement (July 1969).
Points (e) and (f) to some extent contradict the Hong Kong thesis that she will lose trade under the tariff. The implication of (e) and (f) is that all developing countries (ie including Hong Kong) will scramble to pour disruptive quantities of textiles into this market from the beginning of next year. As regards the possible re-imposition of quotas in the UK, Hong Kong will recollect that pretty restrictive conditions have been laid down for the circumstances in which this would be done and the quotas would be on particular products, not across the board. Under this formula, we recognised that certain sectors of our industry might be squeezed by increased competition without our resorting to quotas.
Points (c), (d), (g), and (h) make the points that British entry into the EEC is now more probable than it was in 1969; after entry, Britain would be bound to re-introduce quota restrictions; it is unfair that the tariff on CPA cotton textiles should be imposed in full from the beginning of next year, whereas (if Britain entered the EEC) the c.e.t. on other manufactured goods would be applied later, and by stages; and in the circumstances "in order to minimise the period of uncertainty and disruption" it would be in both countries' interests to postpone the implementation of the tariff until the outcome of our application to join the EEC is known.
We cannot accept these arguments. Nor do we understand the reference to "uncertainty". The tariff decision was announced nearly 2 years before it was to come into effect precisely in order to give industry (and incidentally our overseas suppliers too) sufficient time to adjust themselves to the new conditions. Certainty has been something which has been notably lacking in Lancashire in recent years. That is why the Textile Council laid such stress on the need to switch to a tariff, which they argued would give our industry a stable and predictable framework within which to operate.
The possibility indeed probability
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of EEC entry had been very much
in our minds at the time of the tariff decision in 1969 and the Crosland statement made a specific reference to it. Our progress towards entry since then had not notably been more rapid than could have been predicted at that time. It was essential that, before our entry, our industry should have achieved the target set for it by the Textile Council the raising of its competitiveness and efficiency to European standards. We believed that the tariff decision was a very necessary spur to Lancashire. At present, our industry was gearing itself to compete with unrestricted imports over the tariff in less than a year's time. If we announced that the tariff would not come in effect until we joined the Common Market, the industry would continue to
6.