:
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d)
e)
we should have made it harder for ourselves
to influence Community policy later in a
liberal direction
moreover it would be argued that our policy
during the years 1971 to 1973 would be:
subject to several changes in rapid succession;
in 1971 qr only against the developing
Commonwealth; in 1972 tariffs only; in 1973
tariffs and some qr and possibly some duty free
entry.
On the other hand if we were to attempt to secure a
derogation
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a) it seems unlikely that for the reasons set
out above we should get it; most if not all
of the Member States would support the Commission.
So the only result would be a certain and immediate
public row in which we would be seen to be pressed
(and probably have to accept) the imposition by
us of quantitative restrictions on the import
of Commonwealth texti es. This would obviously
be extremely awkward politically
b) we should have added to the list alreadyuncomfortably
long (cf fish and animal health) of issues which
we have to settle in the few remaining weeks of
the negotiations.
The virtual certainty of being refused a derogation
by the Community particularly given the number of issues,
which we already have to settle in the few remaining weeks
of the negotiations gives us no real choice but to accept
the application to us of the Community's restraint agree-
ments and thus have to reintroduce a measure of quantitative
restriction on imports by 1973 or possibly even earlier.
The major awkwardness of this course of action is
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