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not a concerted campaign.
4. MR BOTTOMLEY confirmed Mr Cleveland's understanding that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not be leading the
British Delegation to the OECD Ministerial meeting. Mr Noble
would do so and Mr Higgins would also be going to the meeting.
GENERALISED AND REVERSE PREFERENCES
5.
MR CLEVELAND referred to the points made by Mr Samuels
during his recent visit to Britain, to the effect that the US
hoped to adopt a more flexible position about requiring
beneficiaries to declare now their intention to remove reverse
The Americans were still in some
preferences by 1975.
difficulties on this:
some argued that, if no advance promise
were insisted on and if the LDCs then failed to withdraw the
reverse preferences, by 1975, the US would find it difficult to
withdraw GPS benefits at that point after they had been granted
for several years. The Americans would find it helpful to have
any evidence that might be available to us and that might show
that the LDCs concerned could feel safe in withdrawing reverse
preferences without losing the benefits already enjoyed.
6. MR BOTTOMLEY said that, while we would let the Americans
know if we obtained any helpful information, this question was
of course a matter between the LDCs and the Americans rather
than one involving ourselves. So far as Commonwealth countries
were concerned, the problem arose mainly in the Caribbean
(we enjoyed hardly any preferences in Africa). The countries
concerned would have to consider their position, particularly
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