I
ONFIDENTIA
2
A
PM&Ms
думыв
5.
us.
It would obviously be very helpful, before approaching Washington; if we could have a firm (and reasonably meaningful) Japanese offer in hand. The question is, how long can we afford to wait ? As far as we can ascertain, the U.S. attitude towards Hong Kong is still conditionally negative; that is to say, the U.S. will exclude Hong Kong unless the E.E.C. and Japan include
Even though the U.S. Bill, when eventually drafted, has a long and hazardous passage through Congress ahead of it, there is no doubt that a firm and favourable White House decision on our status before the inquisition by Committee process begins would be eminently desirable. Alec Hermann is keeping up the pressure in Washington and State Department officials are prone to make sympathetic noises and undertakings to defend our interests "at the appropriate time". But perhaps we ought to be thinking now of something fairly high level and formal to try to exert maximum influence while the U.S. party line is under intensive consideration. The U.S. have still to respond formally to the aide memoire lodged by the Embassy on 25 May, 1970. My personal view is that some time soon the F.C.O. might send for a suitably high level official from the U.S. Embassy and return to the subject, pointing out that E.E.C. inclusion is settled and, as they very well know, Japanese inclusion seems imminent (if it has not by then been announced); and come evidence of favourable consideration by the U.S. Administration would be welcome.
6.
I would appreciate your thoughts on this possibility before launching it here. I am copying this letter to Derek Jones in Geneva, Alec Hermann in Washington and David Sellers in London.
Sou
ever,
0.H. Kemmis, Esq.,
Department of Trade and Industry,
1, Victoria Street,
London, S.W.1,
ENGLAND.
c.c. D.J.C. Jones, Esq., Geneva
A.H.B. Hermann, Esq., Washington D.M. Sellers, Esq., London
WD/1ch
مي
(W. Dorward)